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THE BOOK OF HOSEA 
AS VISIONARY PROPHECY: 
A SEARCH FOR GENRE 
. .. 
LAURA BARGE 
As a literary critic presuming to write about the book of Hosea as an example of 
the prophetic Scriptures of the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Old Testament, I 
am constrained to begin with a definition of my critical approach. Unfashionably, I 
do not read the texts under consideration using postmodem literary theories such 
as deconstruction, reader response, or exploration of cultural determinism. I Instead, 
I find much more useful an approach that is best described in literary terms as a 
blend of the earlier theories of the New Criticism and structuralism. In fact, the 
very concept of literary genre rests on elements that the earlier approaches, in con-
trast to the later, value in texts, elements such as unity, coherence, unique style, 
and specific modes of thematic expression. 
As an amateur in biblical studies, I work convinced that scholars such as 
Brevard Childs and James Sanders are on target in their insistence that interpreta-
tion proceed from a canonical concept of the Old Testament. Such interpretation 
interacts with a text as it presently exists rather than as a collage of various stages 
through history of disparate composition. Recognition of a canonical whole does 
not trivialize a study of the multiple historical processes and stages by which a 
prophetic text has arrived at its present form, but it does insist that the canonical 
form is the final Scripture to be interpreted as the record reflecting the "history of 
encounter between God and Israel."2 
The question of the authorial intentionality of such a view of the prophetic writ-
ings cannot be ignored. Who or what is ultimately responsible for the multiple 
authorial processes resulting in a canonical text? Childs recognizes a "major literary 
and theological force" in the shaping of the "present form of the Hebrew Bible."3 
From original recorded oral fragments through the revisions of tradents to the emer-
gence of texts as sacred canon, the message of the prophets is a "theocentric word" 
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proceeding from a "divine source" that has ordered the stages of the composition of the 
received text.4 
Another question that must be addressed in advance of any study such as this one is 
the existence of the prophetic writings as both the Hebrew Scriptures of Judaism and the 
Old Testament of Christianity. It is true that the writings differ in regard to text, scope, 
and order and that numerous complex claims have been put forth for both the continuity 
and discontinuity of the two versions.s Within the boundaries of my work here, however, 
we need note only two basic facts that can hardly be disputed. The New Testament writ-
ers' use of the Hebrew canon does not demonstrate rejection or alteration but rather a 
new interpretation of these Scriptures grounded on the New Testament's claims about 
Jesus Christ. Furthermore, these Christian claims are dependent upon both the Christian 
and Jewish Scriptures as the sacred canon that is the record of God's revelation of truth to 
Israel, the church, and the world6 
I. THE PROBlEM OF GENRE 
My interest in the genre of the Old Testament books of prophecy emerged in my 
teaching of university courses on the Bible as literature. As I led students through the vari-
ety of genres that make up the Bible and arrived at the Old Testament books of prophe-
cy- Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the twelve minor prophets, Hosea through Malachi- I 
made the discovery that the students were dissatisfied with both my classroom presenta-
tion of these books and with the published critical commentary about them. I have come 
to understand their discontent. In standard works on the literary genres of the Bible, sub-
stantive content on the books of prophecy is scattered and fragmentary. In fact, critics 
such as Northrop Fyre, Robert Alter, Tremper Longman, and Leland Ryken acknowledge 
that offered treatments of the prophets are incomplete and less than satisfactory. Consider 
the following introduction with which Ryken prefaces his application of the stylistic cate-
gory of satire to the book of Amos: 
The part of the Bible that gives literary critics most difficulty is the prophetic books. 
The reasons are multiple .. . . prophecy in the biblical sense is not a common genre 
at large. When judged by classical standards of unity, moreover, prophecy is too 
miscellaneous in structure and content to seem manageable. Literary critics look in 
vain for the superstructure that will provide a unifying impression of a prophetic 
book of the Bible. . . . [A critical suggestion] finally emerges as too amorphous to 
impose a firm unity on the prophetic book. 7 
What are some reasons or difficulties that have prevented critics from defining such a 
superstructure, a particular literary genre that can be applied to this collection of books as 
a whole? One reason is that we must be careful not to join what Kugel somewhat mock-
ingly calls the "Task Force on Genre.'" Modem categories of genre are just that, conven-
tional categories that are neither "timeless" nor "ultimate." A responsible critic does not 
impose modem conventions that are "foreign" to the givens of the Bible's linguistic/ histori-
cal origins.8 Perhaps there is no modem generic term that can serve as an umbrella for 
this group of writings. 
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An initial difficulty is that the differentiation between prose and poetry-a distinction 
that is difficult to make in other types of biblical writings- is nowhere more problematic 
than here. And even when a critic makes a beginning of useful distinctions, he faces the 
daunting task of accounting for what Alter terms an unexplained and "uneven drift" in 
the prophetic writings from strong poetry to weakened poetic forms to overt prose.9 The 
oracles of the book of Isaiah are in the linguistic shape of Hebrew poetry, but the lines on 
the Scroll where they occur are in prose form.'o 
A second difficulty is that the presently recognized generic term widely applied to this 
collection of books- that of "oracle"-is inadequate from a literary approach. This applica-
tion, initiated by historical form-critical research, assigns the genre of oracle only to separate 
units in the prophetic books, claiming that the books as total entities are not "systematic 
compositions" but collections of short speeches from the prophetic activities of Israel during 
these centuries. To move beyond analysis and classification of these original speech units 
becomes speculation." More recent form-critical efforts include study of redaction strate-
gies that acknowledge the additions and changes made by editors other than the original 
author that result in the final form of a book '2 Such efforts may move closer to the basic 
premise of Tremper Longman's literary approach that "genre analysis is synchronic" and 
thus "concerned to identify the type of literature [as it presently exists], not its prehistory"'3 
and yet continue what is essentially analysis of separate segments of a text. Tucker can 
agree that a "prophetic book itself is an appropriate unit for ... analysis, representing the 
final stage in the development of the tradition and a quite distinct genre of literature with 
certain typical features,"'· and yet continue to treat a prophetic writing as a collection of 
"units ... whether large or small, 'original' or late .. . by means of form-critical analysis."'s 
This complex and often frustrating identifying of types of oracles, although yielding 
useful information about content, can demonstrate the law of diminishing returns in at 
least three ways. Marvin Sweeney explains the first problem (read text as book in the fol-
lowing quotation) : 
Genres [defined as these individual oracular units] can determine the overall form 
of a distinct prophetic text, but they do not necessarily do so. Typical generic ele-
ments frequently function within a text and playa role in its composition or formu-
lation, but they do not necessarily dictate its composition or formulation .... Each 
text is unique even though it employs typical elements of genre. Genres do not 
always define texts; they function within them as compositional tools. '6 
A content primarily composed of short speech units is a common characteristic of 
these books, but can we say that this characteristic is the "genre" that identifies the overar-
ching literary structure of these books? As Tremper Longman insists, 'The literary 
approach asks the question of the force of the whole."'7 A second problem is functional. 
How many types of oracles are there, where do they differ and where overlap, and how 
many pages of criticism would it take to squeeze the total content of these fifteen books 
into these categories, categories that relentlessly slip and slide into multiplicity and divi-
sion? Johannes Lindblom, the Swedish theologian who devoted forty years of his life to 
studying the prophets, agrees with form criticism that the "primary form of a prophetic 
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utterance was . .. the oracle." Lindblom describes the "original oracles" as "short, concise, 
pregnant, and formulated in a peculiar fashion." While acknowledging that some such 
original oracular forms are still recognizable in the prophetic books, Lindblom clarifies that 
"the prophets also used the oracle form for utterances which were not oracles in the strict 
sense." In fact, Lindblom believes that the writings as we now have them offer evidence 
that "the old oracle form disintegrated and that the utterances of the later prophets are 
mostly pseudo-oracles" that can be very different in content from the original form. ls 
When Ryken mentions eight-" oracle of judgment, oracle of salvation, wisdom saying, 
'woe' statement, report of visions, kingdom oracle, hymn, and lament" -he cautiously calls 
them "subgenres" and points out that they define content but not "superstructure."19 
The third problem to this form-critical solution to generic identification of the prophet-
ic books is crucial in implication: Is there a characteristic order, or a variety of orders, that 
can be determined for the oracles as collected in the different books? And what is the liter-
ary justification for and method of achieving this order? The form critic would answer this 
question by focusing on the formulaic connections or linguistic signs, such as a change in 
person or verb tense, that signal the beginning or ending of a separate oracle, and would 
interpret "order" as rudimentary efforts to make the passages easier to read.20 But ease of 
reading is not literary order, nor can analysis of these formulaic "hinges" that join separate 
oracles bestow literary unity. This claim holds true even if "each [Jinked] oracle is related 
to a specific event" and "located in its original cultural milieu." As we shall see, the literary 
unity of a prophetic book must be discerned in the book's total canonical form, a form 
achieved by continued revision and addition through time.2I Only in this form, the 
Scripture that subordinates original historical forms to theological, holistic interpretation, 
can the question of literary unity be addressed.22 
II. PARTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
Confronting these difficulties, critics have suggested various choices of literary types 
that might serve as an inclusive term for these books. Can we not say that a prophetic 
book is a proclamation or sermon? According to Lindblom, "[Tlhe bulk of the utterances 
reproduced in the prophetic books were really delivered as public speeches or sermons."23 
And these designations hold, even if the eighth through the sixth century prophets do 
not, for the most part, deliver their messages in the formal context of worship ceremonies 
or as a recognized religious duty.24 However, both historical knowledge and the texts of 
the books as we have them urge us toward more precise formulations. We are fairly cer-
tain that no prophetic book is an original and exclusive collection of the proclamations of 
a single prophet. Books such as Isaiah and Zechariah give evidence that later anonymous 
authors or editors have contributed to the final written form of the book. Two distinct 
forms of the book of Jeremiah exist, one in the Greek and one in the Masoretic tradition. 
Research is making increasingly clear that each of these books is a conscious literary cre-
ation with its unique structure and cumulative authorial intentions.25 
Other analyses of prophecy successfully assign a literary mode or style to a particular 
book. Thus Ryken analyzes both the book of Amos and that of Jonah as satire,26 and 
Thomas Jemielity has written a book entitled Satire and the Hebrew Prophets.27 Obviously, 
these designations are not intended as efforts to arrive at some common genre for the 
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prophetic books as a whole but to offer evidence that these writings offer rich possibilities 
for literary interpretation. In fact, the short book of Hosea can be variously described as 
the narrative of the marriage of Hosea, the drama of his and Comer's relationship, the 
diatribe pronounced against Comer (and Israel), the irony of a woman immoral in some 
fashion being selected by God as a prophet's wife, the tragedy of Israel's departure from 
Jehovah, and the symbol of Hosea's love for Comer as representing Cod's enduring love 
for Israel. But, if all of these designations were assigned, the question remains: How do 
these specific styles blend together into one unified composition? Or do they? 
m. Focus ON A PARTICULAR SOLUTION 
To my thinking. the richest and most exciting possibility in the search for a definitive 
literary genre that might encompass and specify the prophetic writings as a group begins 
with Ryken's term "visionary literature" or "visionary writing." Ryken uses the term as a 
chapter heading in his handbook published in 1984, How to Read the Bible as Literature, 
and means by it one of two "types" or general categories including all literature that, 
rather than being a "replica of existing reality," is "an alternative to known reality." The 
biblical literature that Ryken includes in this "type" is "represented chiefly in the related 
genres of prophecy and apocalypse."28 In Words of Delight (1992), Ryken lists "visionary 
writing" as a genre and includes in it prophecy and apocalypse.29 In the remainder of this 
article, I want to streamline this term to "visionary prophecy" and to limit its suggested 
application to the fifteen prophetic books of the Old Testament. I will then develop the 
term "visionary prophecy" by jumping off from chosen content in Ryken's chapter in How 
to Read the Bible, comparing other similarly focused critical thinking on this problem, and 
instancing the book of Hosea, which I have already referred to above, as an example of 
my application. To pursue this task, I will consider the following elements as they build lit-
erary unity in a prophetic book such as Hosea: origin, source, purpose, surface structure, 
use of figural language, and the relationship of this language to a deeper thematic struc-
ture that undergirds the surface of the text. Although my conclusions are of necessity 
focused here on the book of Hosea, implicit in my argument is the belief that my analyses 
can work toward the discovery of similar unified structures in the other prophetic books, 
thus allowing the generic term "visionary prophecy" to encompass them as well. 
IV. ORIGIN 
While, as we have seen, descriptions of kinds of oracles fall short of arriving at a holistic 
definition of genre, recourse to the term oracle-which has the primary meaning of "the 
response of a god to a question asked him by a worshiper" - situates the writings in the 
origins of their own time and place. Nearly all pagan oracular literature in the ancient 
world was Creek, although Rome had its smaller national collection.30 In this tradition, the 
oracle supposedly comes from persons directly inspired or spoken to by a god, or by assis-
tants who interpret the original message so that the supplicant can understand it.3] For our 
purposes, we can note the following about this pagan tradition. (I) The questions asked 
pertain to the future and have an individual connection to the supplicant. (2) The person 
directly inspired by the god speaks in some degree of ecstasy, of frenzied or mantic articu-
lation, an utterance that must often be rendered understandable by an assistant.32 (3) The 
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activity and its written results occur primarily in times of national stress, such as the Creek 
Peloponnesian War and the Roman Civil Wars.33 (4) The supplicant is often expected to 
respond to the delivered oracle by making a sacrifice or founding a religious cult.H (5) The 
god's response can be symbolic as well as verbal, such as sounds or sights in nature or the 
actions of uninvolved persons.35 
Studies, including anthropological research, of prophetic phenomena in ancient Near 
Eastem regions such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Canaan indicate the activities of persons 
claiming to be in direct contact with the divine. Such prophets may appear on the edges 
of a society and advocate change, or they may operate within established religious or 
social structures. Typically organizing themselves into diverse groups, some prophets 
undergo ecstatic experiences and some do not. All, however, are expected to exhibit cer-
tain stereotypical characteristics that mark them as prophets and insure their acceptance 
as such by a given social group.36 
The exact nature of prophecy in early Israel remains more a matter of questions than 
of clear answers. The two major questions are those of the continuity of the early 
prophets with the writing prophets and the complexity of coordinating the information 
on prophets of the early period from the various Old Testament books.3? Research has, 
however, established certain general descriptions of such prophetic activity. Samuel, a 
judge and priest in the established religious orders, also functions as a prophet. He is 
involved in various prophetic actions in regard to the selection and establishment of Saul 
and David as kings, thus playing crucial and positive roles in the establishment of the 
monarchy (( Sam, chapters 9-16 and 28). When Saul exhibits the prophetic trait of ecstat-
ic behavior, however, Old Testament accounts vary in expressing approval (( Sam I 0-1 I) 
and disapproval (( Sam 19:9-24) of his activities.38 The two prophets Nathan (II Sam 7: 1-
17) and Cad (I Sam 22:5) are presented as being in alliance with King David. Nathan 
does denounce David for his adultery with Bathsheba (I( Sam 12: 1-14) but helps to 
arrange the accession of Solomon (( Kngs 1:8-53).39 Ahijah of Shiloh, as late as the reign 
of jeroboam, functions as a prophet in allowing the division of the kingdom and uphold-
ing jeroboam's rule of the Northern Kingdom (( Kngs II: 29-39). By the period of time 
described in the Elijah and Elisha stories, such prophetic figures may no longer be allied 
with royal establishments but instead have become spokesmen against what they con-
ceive to be apostate regimes. Ahijah (( Kngs 14: 1-18), jehu (I Kngs 16: 1- 4), Micaiah (( 
Kngs 22), and various bands of prophets deliver messages that are in opposition to the 
social and religious status quo. Some bands of prophets are disciples or assistants of Elijah 
and Elisha (2 Kngs 2:3, 5, 7, 15-16) and may have been responsible for preserving the 
records of the prophetic tradition in Israel.4o 
This complex picture can yield the following conclusions regarding prophecy in 
early Israel. The prophets' messages are based on their concepts of Israel's covenant tra-
ditions and their understandings of the people's response to these traditions. The 
prophets' function is to communicate between the people and Cod. Some are related 
to a cult and some operate as individuals. Some demonstrate ecstatic behavior, while 
others do not. And the prophet's role increasingly becomes that of a reformer as the 
kings and priests of Israel, and then judah, lead their subjects toward conditions that 
result in captivity by foreign nations:' 
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By the time of Israel's writing prophets of the eighth through the sixth centuries-from 
Amos to Malachi-ties with particular situations are looser or broken, and the prophet has 
become the unique spokesman of Cod's message, addressed not only to apostate kings 
and false religious leaders but to all the sinful citizens. And the prophets' only prophetic 
actions are a symbolic acting out of the content of the divine word delivered to them.42 
Furthermore, both the prophetic words and actions become more of a forth-telling than a 
foretelling. But these prophetic events, like their pagan counterparts, occur during periods 
of national stress, beginning during the dissolution of the Northern Kingdom, continuing 
during the fall of Judah, and extending into the periods of exile. What we shall see as we 
continue to search for a genre for the prophetic writings is that certain preternatural ele-
ments of the pagan writings are transformed in the Jewish historical crisis into Cod's div-
inatory inspiration of the prophets. Thus Israel's prophetic writings prefigure and move 
toward the apocalyptic, a type of writing that occurs between the second century B.CE. 
and the second century C E. and that exhibits even more divinatory traits, such as an 
increased reliance on trance-like experiences, an emphasis on eschatology, and the use of 
numerical symbolism and esoteric language.43 
V. SOURCE 
When Ryken states that visionary literature often deals with things "not in empirical 
reality" but as they exist in the imagination of the writer (VL 165)/4 he situates the defini-
tive source of such writing in the imaginative consciousness of the writer rather than in 
realistic apprehension of the outward world. To accept the claim of the prophetic writings 
that the original source of their language is a unique inspiration of Cod's Spirit does not 
negate the fact that the imagination of the writer remains the human source. The inspira-
tion occurs, by whatever method of divine impetus, within the human consciousness. 
And this consciousness is, in a literary sense, Romantic in that perception of reality is 
forcefully shaped by the imagination of the writer. In fact, it is precisely this imaginative 
locus that allows the radical shifting in space and time that precludes any attempt at a 
conventional definition of setting in the writings. Ryken describes these radical shifts as 
"reversals and transformations" that portray reality other than as presently perceived. Thus 
the prophet's vision reconstructs ordinary reality, merging the present almost indiscrimi-
nately with the future, either near or distant (VL 166-67) and with earthly and cosmic 
space far beyond the prophet's present experience (Vl 167-68). 
VI. PuRPOSE 
By focusing specifically at this point on the book of Hosea as an instance of the 
prophetic books, we can note that about 760 B.CE. Hosea begins his ministry to Israel, the 
Northern Kingdom, during the reign of Jeroboam II (Hos I : I and 2 Kngs 15: I) . The 
prophet's imaginative perception of life in Israel is radically different from the view of the 
ordinary, even religious, citizen. Life at this time seems generally productive and peaceful 
in the land, but Hosea perceives the nation as morally and spiritually bankrupt and creates 
language that both reverses and transforms the nation's present condition. In reversal, 
Israel has already come under judgment; in transformation, the nation has moved beyond 
judgment to restoration. The prophet's descriptions are those of a seer whose vision 
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moves at will through time and space. The following passages from Hosea reveal this 
visionary movement as encompassing Israel's judgment and restoration not only with 
future historical time but also with eternal, cosmic realms of time and space: 
Samaria [the Northern kingdom, IsraelJ shall bear her guilt, because she has rebelled 
against her God; they shall fall by the sword, their little ones shall be dashed in 
pieces, and their pregnant women ripped open. (13 : I 6) Israel . . . shall blossom like 
the lily ... . They shall again live beneath my shadow, they shall flourish as a garden 
.... What more has Ephraim to do with idols? It is I who answer and look after 
you (14:5-8). Shall I ransom them from the power of Sheol? Shall I redeem them 
from Death? 0 Death, where are your plagues? 0 Sheol, where is your destruc-
tion? (13 :14) 
Within the boundaries of a Jewish reading of this passage, the phrase denoting redemp-
tion from death can easily be read metaphorically- since the entire book is replete with fig-
ural language-as a reference to some kind of future historical restoration of Israel as the 
nation of God. Thus the language could be thought to refer to either of two versions of 
modem Jewish messianism described by David Novak as "apocalyptic messianism" and 
"historical messianism." The first term denotes a Jewish nation forged by a powerful ruler 
who gathers the exiles back to the land of Israel, establishes a government based on the 
Torah, and rebuilds the temple. The second term describes a process not brought about by 
human resources within history but by divine action at the end of history. Present-day 
adherents to the first version find such processes underway in the establishment of the 
state of Israel in the twentieth century. Those of the second wait still for the earthly reign of 
a transcendent Messiah at the end of history.45 The first version pushes Hosea's prophecy 
into twentieth-century history; the second pushes it into eternal, cosmic realms. 
But a Christian reading of these Old Testament passages can also function as a fore-
grounding to substantiate the literary claim that the last passage does indeed stretch the 
prophet's imagined conditions of God's people into etemal, cosmic realms. Paul, in his 
treatise on the Christian resurrection in the book of First Corinthians, quotes the pas-
sage- in a slightly modified form- as referring to the post-historical resurrection of 
Christians (both Jewish and Gentile) as the people of God (15 :55) . In this reading, 
Hosea's writings become a prophetic rejoicing in God's counter forces of "plagues" and 
"destruction" against death. 
To make this allowance is not to suggest that the eighth-century Jewish prophet Hosea, 
who addresses "real people in a given period of history,"46 has a New Testament theologi-
cal understanding of the Christian resurrection. But it is to claim that the message of hope 
in verses such as 14 :5-8 and 13:4 exists in a text that has its origin in the visionary imagi-
nation of an Old Testament seer/ prophet, and that this message is interpreted centuries 
later by a New Testament Jewish Christian as referring to a post-historical resurrection of 
God's people based on the resurrection of Jesus. The question here is what James Sanders 
refers to as the "task" of "establishing a canonically permissible range of resignification. As . 
. . texts journey through the Bible from inception through the last books of the New 
Testament, they become resignified to some extent. The .. . question has to do with the 
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limits to which the readjustments in meaning canonically may gO."47 Hosea's visionary lan-
guage is not necessarily limited in its reference to Hosea's era but may become by divine 
ordering a sacred word that, as Childs insists, continues to "offer judgment and hope to 
future generations far beyond the temporal confines of Hosea himself."48 
YD. SURFACE STRUClURE OR STYLE OF THE TExT 
When Ryken claims that biblical visionary literature is a "subversive form," he explains 
what he intends by the adjective: 
Visionary writing attacks our ingrained patterns of deep-level thought . . . to con-
vince us ... that there is something drastically wrong with the status quo. Visionary 
literature is a revolutionary genre. It announces an end to the way things are and 
opens up alternate possibilities. (VL 169, 175) 
Ryken is referring not only to the surrealistic descriptions of apocalypse (Vl 169) but also 
to the jolting style of the prophetic writings, a style that is both compelling and disruptive as 
it shocks readers into realizing that the language they are reading does not mirror the ordi-
nary world in a familiar way (VL 170). To explore this idea is to realize that the subversive 
use of language is often visionary in style and is nearly always associated with some degree 
of incitement to revolution. Thus the British Romantic poets follow the French Rousseau in 
writing highly imaginative literature (think of William Blake) that not only supports political 
and social revolution but also advocates a radical upheaval in the established literary theory 
and practice of the day. Even earlier the Italian Giambattista Vico (1668-1 744) describes in 
his primitive Sdenza Nuova humans who use visionary and mythical language as a verbal 
weapon to seize power from whatever generation has preceded them.49 
The prophet Hosea is involved in revolution, but it is a counter-revolution. In the 
"indictment" that the Lord has against Israel (4: I and 12:2), Hosea is on God's side-the 
original and rightful ruler of the nation- and thus in active process of undermining its pre-
sent misguided leadership. The sinful revolution of the people against God's governance 
and God's choosing of Hosea as his spokesperson push the prophet to use the language 
of subversion to incite a new revolution against the present order of things. This use of 
disruptive language is apparent in a passage beginning with verse four of chapter thirteen 
and continuing through verse eight: 
... [ have been the Lord your God ever since the land of Egypt; you know no god 
but me, and besides me there is no savior (4). It was I who fed you in the wilder-
ness, in the land of drought (5) . When I fed them, they were satisfied ... and their 
heart was proud; therefore they forgot me (6). So [ will become like a lion to them, 
like a leopard I will lurk beside the way (7). I will fall upon them like a bear robbed 
of her cubs, and will tear open the covering of their heart; there I will devour them 
like a lion, as a wild animal would mangle them (8). 
To attempt to read these verses as a continuum or a unit is to encounter an unexplained 
dissimilarity that jars both the reader's expected continuity of logic and his literary sensibil-
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ity. Herbert Marks likens the "persistence of [such) discordant features" to the "superim-
posed figures of paleolithic cave art."so Struggling to respond, the reader is forced to an 
uncomfortable alertness by being dislodged from familiar expectations of what reading 
language, even poetry, is supposed to be like. Verses four and five seem to be a common 
recitation of Cod's mighty deeds on Israel's behalf- brought out of Egypt and cared for in 
the wildemess. But in verse six the state of blessedness and dependency tums abruptly 
and without explanation into the contrary condition of a satisfaction that has forgotten its 
source, given way to self sufficiency and pride, and forgotten its need of the wildemess 
Benefactor. In verses seven and eight that Benefactor tums against the wildemess dwellers 
and becomes a lion or leopard who tears and devours them. Most absent from the 
rhetoric of the passage are conjunctive, explanatory aids to cognitive progress through the 
verses. The writer seems angry and punishes his readers by throwing language at them. 
The imagery is no help but instead counterproductive to efforts to assimilate the intent of 
the language. The lion here is a devourer, but several verses earlier, in the eleventh chap-
ter, the Benefactor/Cod roars like a lion and the people experience a new exodus from 
enemy territory (Assyria) and are placed safely in their houses (II: I 0-1 I). Ryken 
describes such disturbing language as having a "kaleidoscopic structure" and remarks on 
the difficulty of any reader following its "shifting" and "diverse" content without being 
forcibly brought into new ways of thought and response NL 170). 
This cancellation of expected continuity can be described, then, as a deliberate linguis-
tic strategy to carry out the prophet's subversive purpose of calling the audience away 
from their revolution against their Benefactor/ Cod and into a counter-revolution of 
responding with repentance to his offers of mercy and restorationS I Furthermore, this jar-
ring surface structure is common rather than exceptional not only in the book of Hosea 
but also elsewhere in the prophetic writingsS2 Our best response to the writings as litera-
ture may be to heed Ryken's injunction not to look "for the smooth flow of narrative" but to 
"be prepared for a disjointed series of diverse, selfcontained units." Ryken is surely right when he 
agrees with numerous other critics that this "disjointed method" is exactly what "makes 
such literature initially resistant to a literary approach" NL 170). 
Having. in the preceding paragraph, labeled this disjunctive style as a "deliberate linguis-
tic strategy," I must face the question as to whose strategy it is. Is the prophet Hosea- or his 
scribes- responsible for the discontinuous juxtaposition of verses of judgment with verses of 
forgiveness and restoration 7 If so, is the juxtaposition present from the beginning of the 
book's composition or does the prophet add the verses of hope after he thinks the judg-
ment is past, such as the period after the Syro-Ephraimite war in 735-732 when Israel is 
subjected to Assyria but still continues to exist as a puppet nation? Or is the discontinuity 
the result of later tradents altering the text to suit it to different historical situations, such as 
the position of Judah after Israel's definitive fall in 722 but before that of Judah in 857? 
A comparison between two redactional analyses of the first three chapters of Hosea can 
shed light on this question. Clements and Childs both find evidence in the numerous refer-
ences here to the Southem Kingdom of Judah that the entire book has been edited by 
tradents a generation after its original composition, perhaps during the last twenty years of 
the eighth century B.C.E., to confront Judah with the impending judgment of God after 
Israel has already fallen. Both critics find particular evidence of such editing in the first three 
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chapters but disagree about what this evidence reveals about the original text of Hosea. In 
these chapters, Israel consistently receives judgment while Judah remains a possible "recipi-
ent of promise."53 This pattern is evident in verse six of chapter one-"I will no longer have 
pity on the house of Israel or forgive them" - as contrasted with verse seven- "But I will 
have pity on the house of Judah, and I will save them by the Lord their Cod." Clements 
reads the verses of judgment as original warnings to Israel but the verses of blessing as 
redaction additions, added after the fall of Israel, that are based on the false assumption 
that Judah, unlike Israel, would repent and thus avert the disaster threatened by the verses 
of judgment. For Clements, then, the majority of the messages of hope are added by 
tradents who are mistaken in assuming that Judah, unlike Israel, will escape the judgment 
of Cod.54 Childs also reads the verses of judgment as originally written to warn Israel of 
judgment but as being applicable in the historical moment of the late eighth century to 
Judah, now in need of a similar repentance. He reads the verses of hope as also originally 
written and, in any later revision, applicable to Judah as they have been to Israel. Thus he 
views any later discordant juxtaposition of the verses as variations of a similar original jolt-
ing text that had confronted Israel with predictions of judgment or of blessing. 55 Because 
Childs "subordinates the editorial process" to what he sees as the canon's intrinsic intent, he 
avoids the problem of mistaken tradents and reads the discordant passages as saying that 
"judgment and salvation are inextricably joined in the purpose of Cod for his people," held 
"together in the one divine plan." In Cod's prophetic speaking, the warning call of judg-
ment and the merciful offer of forgiveness and restoration are always present.56 
vm. USE OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 
A literary approach can take full advantage of the wealth of figurative language that 
makes Hosea so typical of the other prophetic books. A survey through its fourteen chap-
ters discloses examples of the use of simile (14:5), metaphor 0:8), apostrophe (10:8), 
metonymy (3:4), synecdoche (12:2), and the pathetic fallacy (3:3) . Furthermore, the 
major tropes of irony and paradox function in the motif of blessing or restoration as it 
connects with judgment or national doom. The two contrary experiences fuse into a para-
doxical whole that resonates with the ironic necessity of blessing or salvation never taking 
place until judgment has first occurred. 
IX. SYMBOL AS PRiMARy FIGURE 
Ryken insists that the "basic mode" of any kind of visionary literature, including 
prophecy, is symbolism. "Above all, visionary literature uses the technique of symbolism. 
In fact, it is symbolic through and through, a point that cannot be overstated" NL 17 1). 
While few problems surface in accepting this argument as it applies to apocalyptic litera-
ture such as the Revelation, questions may arise as to Ryken's claim that symbolism is the 
"basic mode" that is used "through and through" the books of prophesy. I want to 
respond to this questioning not only by agreeing with Ryken that symbolism is the domi-
nant literary figure used in the prophetic writings but also by arguing that the symbol 
becomes the device that uncovers a particular thematic substructure that bestows unity 
and coherence on the book of Hosea. 
Exploring the symbol as trope calls first for careful definition. Bullinger names a biblical 
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symbol as a "material subject substituted for a moral or spiritual truth."S? But this definition 
needs refinement. By accepted literary definitions of symbol (those of Coleridge, 
Baudelaire, Proust), a symbol is a word as image that refers to an entity existing within the 
boundaries of the literature that, in tum, evokes meaning(s) beyond itself outside the liter-
ature. By contrast, a metaphor or simile is a word as image that, instead of referring to an 
entity within the literature, refers to something outside it for the purpose of comparing 
that something with an entity that does exist within the literature. 
Walter Brueggemann identifies the "offering of symbols" as the subversive means by 
which the prophets challenge their audience to renounce the sinful and hopeless status 
quo in favor of a future of righteousness and hope. 58 But Brueggemann, whose interest at 
this point is in the prophetic task rather than in the specifics of the language effecting the 
task, allows a symbol to be any language segment bringing to mind some particular and 
positive event from Israel's past history. Thus he seems to equate "symbol" with any 
graphic word picture and fails to differentiate between image, metaphor, and symboJ.59 
Conversely, Ryken explains that a necessary distinction between the pictorial and the 
symbolic is the difference between the pictographic and the ideographic, a difference 
between images that appeal immediately to the senses and objects that trigger multiple 
ideas represented by the object (VL 173), A symbol is not merely an image that paints a 
verbal picture but something that suggests or implies meaning beyond itself as an entity. 
Thus a symbol, which, as noted, must be situated in the literature, functions to embody 
certain ideas or qualities that the figure gathers up and communicates both within and 
beyond the boundaries of the text containing the symbol. 
This symbolic function relates to the already described visionary movement of prophetic 
literature into future historical time as well as into extraterrestrial realms. Numerous critics 
note a poetic quality in the prophetic writings that we can associate with this unlimited 
range of movement, both into the past and the future. Alter suggests that one effect of 
poetic figures in the prophets is to "lift the utterances to a second power of signification," 
giving to particular history "an archetypal horizon." He also sees poetic figures as often 
functioning to situate "historical subjects" of "here and now in cosmic perspectives."60 
Bullinger emphasizes the linguistic connection of the word mystery to the word symbol. The 
Scriptural word nearest to the word symbol is the word mystery, with the patristic Fathers 
using the terms synonymously. Mystery means secret, and comes to mean a "secret sign or 
symbol,"61 with "secret" referring to the layers of expanding reference beneath the surface of 
the symbolic language. Brueggemann points out that, in spite of such archetypal movement 
and multiple layers of meaning, prophetic symbols are always rooted in the history of Israel 
as a nation.62 Soulen also emphasizes the situated reference of biblical figural language by 
describing how the use of any such figure is invariably related to some event in Israel's his-
tory. And even when a figure moves into "world time" or into "nature" in general, the 
sequence of Israel's history as a nation remains the matter at hand6J 
In Hosea the cumulative event of Hosea's marriage, alienation from, and restoration to 
Gomer, along with the birth and naming of the three children, functions as a prophetic 
symbol as described above.64 The early chapters of the book relate an event that can be 
read as actually occurring. The prophet obeys God's instructions to marry a woman who 
is either flawed or vulnerable sexually.6s He marries Gomer and they live together in a 
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marriage that results in the births of two sons and one daughter. Gomer breaks her mar-
riage vows by becoming sexually promiscuous. The husband and wife separate from each 
other. But Hosea's love for Gomer is greater than her sin. He secures her once more, and, 
after a time of testing, restores her to the former marriage relationship khap[s] 1-3). 
My reading of the marriage event is not intended to deny the historical critical prob-
lems of the record of the event. Childs describes the critical efforts to relate as history the 
events of chapters 1-3 as being "consistently frustrated" from ever reaching any kind of 
consensus as to what actually occurs or what precisely the three chapters record.66 My 
claim that the marriage event is the symbolic paradigm that orders the prophetic text is 
not dependent on some ordered narrative of the historicity of the marriage as recorded in 
the first three chapters but on its literary function in the book as a canonical whole. 
Unpacking the sequence of the marriage event results in the following paradigm: A. 
What Hosea, directed by God, does for Gomer B. What Hosea expects of Gomer C. 
How Gomer responds to these expectations D. How Hosea deals with Gomer because of 
her response, and E. What Hosea does for Gomer in spite of her response. Although my 
observations at this point are not attempts at any formal structuralist analysis, this para-
digm is similar in an elementary way to a pattern or model so described. The paradigm 
indicates "the inner organization of the .. . thematic content through which the text [here, 
the marriage narrative] receives its intelligibility." It describes "the constituent elements ... 
and the network of relationships existing between them." Also, a structural arrangement 
of the elements of the paradigm adequately controls the flow of the narrative.67 
x. DEEP STRUCTURE OF TExT INDICATED BY SYMBOL 
The symbolic meaning of this paradigm, which is obvious even on the surface of the 
text, transfers the narrative sequence described from Hosea and Gomer to God and 
Israel. Thus we can construct the following paradigm of the meaning of the marriage narra-
tive as a symbol of the narrative or history of God and Israel. A. What God, directed by his 
own purposes, does for Israel B. What God expects of Israel C. How Israel responds to 
these expectations D. How God deals with Israel because of her response and E. What 
God is doing-and will do- for Israel in spite of her response. 
If we agree, one, that the paradigm of the marriage narrative is competent, that is, that 
it includes everything that is in the narrative and excludes what is not in the narrative, 
and, two, that the symbolic meaning of the marriage narrative transfers into the related 
inclusive paradigm describing God and Israel, then we can say that the narrative of the 
marriage becomes a prophetic symbol that orders the apparently disjunctive segments of 
the text of Hosea. Every verse in the book, either as a single entity or in group format, can 
be outlined under the five headings of the inclusive paradigm derived from the symbolic 
paradigm of the marriage narrative. In fact, even the verses that relate the marriage event 
can be subsumed under the inclusive paradigm that structures God's dealings with Israel. 
The arrangement is neither arbitrary nor forced but seems to account competently for the 
occurrence of all the verses in the fourteen chapters of the book. 
This sequence of five actions, each initiated by God and each enacted in relation to 
Israel, is, of course, the "story" or narrative that orders in a profuse generality the content 
of the entire Old Testament in all its varied literary forms. In a prophetic book, this con-
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trolling "story" is condensed and pushed beneath the disruptive surface text, a surface 
where rearrangement of the verses into the five-point sequence can reveal the book's hid-
den thematic cohesiveness and unity. Thus, in Hosea, the five-point paradigm of the nar-
rative of the marriage becomes a prophetic symbol, a figural microcosm of the macrocos-
mic content of the complete book, welding together not only the disjunctive segments of 
the individual verses but also fusing form and content into a single whole.68 
Child's analysis of the marriage narrative as its stylistic mode and thematic functioning 
may have changed through the stages of the book's composition lends weight to the sym-
bol's structural prominence in the text. Originally, Hosea's sign-acts that constitute the mar-
riage event are an "attack upon Israel's syncretistic religious worship which had transformed 
the worship of Yahweh into a fertility cult."69 Israel has adopted the Canaanite mythological 
belief that deity and the land exist in a "symbiotic" relationship with each other. Worship of 
this deity is enacted by the cultic practice of marriageable virgins temporarily acting as tem-
ple prostitutes and offering payments for such acts to the deity of fertility, behavior which 
Hosea boldly denounces as a betrayal of religious loyalty which is idolatry. The Israelites 
have subscribed to a cultic myth that has involved them in sexual immorality, and Hosea's 
actions and words are an accusation within that mythological construct.'° 
In the later editing of the original text where its message is extended to Judah, Childs 
sees mythological language becoming purely metaphorical. The people of Judah as a 
whole are not engaged in idolatrous acts of sacred marriage with the mythological Baal, as 
their Israelite kinsmen had been earlier in the century. Rather the Southem Kingdom has 
polluted its worship by a general breaking of the commandments of Yahweh that ignores 
his covenant with the nation?! The present shape of the first three chapters gives evi-
dence that the historical sign-acts have been changed into overt metaphor. Chapters one 
and three cannot be read sequentially as an integrated narrative. These chapters are sepa-
rated by chapter two, which relates no action but functions only as a metaphorical 
description of actions referred to in chapters one and two. Childs reads these three chap-
ters as a later redaction than whatever editing had occurred in chapters 4-14. The initial 
chapters provide an "exegetical key" that unlocks interpretation of the sign-acts as a 
metaphor that continues to speak as Scripture to generations that follow late eighth-centu-
ry Judah.72 By my definitions, this metaphor has become in the present text of Hosea an 
example of the uniquely complex, multi-level symbol that I am suggesting is endemic to 
the prophetic writings. 
The question now arises as to how this prophetic symbol moves beyond the bound-
aries of Hosea as an isolated text. That is, how does the marriage narrative as symbol pos-
sess multiple layers of meaning, depict visionary movement, connect linguistically with 
whatever the word mystery signifies, and yet remain rooted in Israel's history as a nation? 
The names of Comer's three children add these visionary characteristics to the narrative, 
thus qualifying it fully as a prophetic symbol. Each name, in its initial function within the 
boundaries of the narrative of the marriage, signifies the unfaithfulness of Comer to her 
husband Hosea and his rejection of his adulterous wife, and, if not all of the children, at 
least the last two. The Hebrew text of the book Hosea is not clear as to whether the chil-
dren belong to Hosea,73 but very clearly states that Comer has broken her marriage vows, 
has "played the whore" and "acted shamefully" in going after her "lovers" (Hos 2:5). Also 
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clear is Hosea's initial rejection at some point in the marriage of Gomer and, in some 
degree, of the children (Hos 2:3-4). 
The meanings of the children's names as assigned by God signify these narrative devel-
opments of betrayal, rejection, and judgment, but apply their linguistic weight, not to 
Hosea's marriage, but to Israel's covenantal history. God's pronouncement of the first 
son's name, Jezreel, connects with the incomplete obedience of Israel's king Jehu and 
God's warning that after four generations Jehu's descendants will be cut off. The name 
Jezreel also links with the unfaithfulness of Israel to God's decrees through many genera-
tions, as epitomized in the long history of national violence that has occurred in the geo-
graphical site called the Valley of Jezreel. In this valley, Jehu seizes with betrayal and mur-
der the throne from Ahab's descendants and inaugurates the dynasty of Jeroboam II ([[ 
Kngs 10), the king to whose rule Hosea is prophesying an end. Thus the name becomes a 
cumulative symbol of a definitive, imminent onset of judgment on the nation of Israel?4 
The names of the daughter and the last son signify God's rejection of his covenant peo-
ple. The name Loruhamah means "unpitied" or "no more mercy," and Loammi means 
"you are not my people." These names indicate the removal of God's love from Israel and 
the nullification of his covenant relationship with them.75 
But Hosea and Gomer's marriage story does not end here. Hosea finds Gomer and 
secures her again as his chastised but restored wife. And the children's names as recorded 
in the passages relating this final development in the marriage change their signifying. The 
name Jezreel, previously signifying the bloody valley, appears in a passage describing the 
sowing of seeds and an earth bearing grain, wine, and oil (Hos 2: 22-23). A play on 
words in a comparison of the two appearances of the name "Jezreel" is that in the initial 
context, which links the name with the bloody valley, "Jezreel" can be translated as "God 
scatters." This translation logically implies the act of "scattering" as part of the destruction 
of judgment. In the second context, which describes a fertile land and its products, the 
translation becomes "God sows," with the verb "sows" being a Hebrew variant of "scat-
ters" in the word "Jezreel."76 In further changed signifying, the name Loruhamah, meaning 
"not pitied," loses its prefIX meaning "not" to become "Ruhamah" or "having obtained 
pity," and the name Loammi, meaning "not my people" is reconstituted as "Ammi" or 
"my people" (Hos 2: I) . The reversal of these two names indicates a restoration of God's 
covenant relation with Israel.77 
Functioning as part of the prophetic symbol that is the narrative in which they appear, 
the children's names escape the particular record of the marriage narrative and expand in 
symbolic representation to indicate the central message of the text of Hosea as a whole. 
Because of Israel's unfaithfulness, God rejects her as his covenant people, but, because of 
his great love and mercy, he is bringing the nation through judgment to a state of restora-
tion with himself. A passage such as the following refers not to Hosea and Gomer but to 
God and Israel : 
And I will take you for my wife forever; I will take you for my wife in righteousness 
and in justice, in steadfast love, and in mercy .... On that day I will answer, says the 
Lord, I will answer the heavens and they shall answer the earth; and the earth shall 
answer the grain, the wine, and the oil, and they shall answer Jezreel; and I will sow 
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him for myself in the land. And I will have pity on Loruhamah, and I will say to 
Loammi, 'You are my people'; and he shall say, 'You are my God.' (Hos 2: 19,21 -23) 
Thus restored, Israel becomes faithful in her covenant with God: she says, " .. . [w]hat 
have I to do with idols?" She has leamed that only from her Benefactor/ God is blessed-
ness found (Hos 14:8). 
Exactly when and how this national fulfillment of the domestic symbol takes place is a 
matter of much debate among different religious groups as well as among various theologi-
cal divisions in those groups. But as description of the fulfillment of Hosea's multi-layered 
symbol, the quoted passage is in exact accord with what we can call other E verses (the pas-
sages of promised blessing that are discordantly juxtaposed with passages of judgment) in 
the double layers of the textual structure of the book. And in the privilege of visionary 
prophecy, the astonishing "reversal and transformation" N. L.166) simply takes place with 
no apparent concem to offer definitive historical interpretation for either early or subsequent 
readers. God's never-ending search for his people that results in their repentance and return 
to him is described but not historically outlined (Hos 6: I and 8:2). As Brueggemann insists, 
the emphasis in what I am categorizing as the E verses is not on how or when Israel is 
restored but on the "gracious gifts" of the mighty God who is the restorer.78 
A Christian reading, then, is not the only way that this symbol can move beyond the 
boundaries of Hosea as a single book situated in the group of the Old Testament 
prophetic writings. Jewish readings can find Hosea's promises applicable to God's judg-
ment and subsequent blessings to the Jewish people throughout history. All modem 
Messianic Jewish writing is, of course, dominated by the twin events of the Holocaust and 
the establishment of the modem state of Israel. In describing different versions of both the 
despair (over the Holocaust) and hope (over the established nation), Novak concludes 
that "the God who saved us [the Jewish people] from Hitler and who gave us the State of 
Israel is neither a God whose covenant has been falsified nor a God whose final and 
unique messianic victory has yet come.79 
But a Christian reading of this symbol is also longstanding and can offer an alternate 
description of the symbol's reaching into the future. The New Testament has been the 
primary interpreter of the Old for the church through two thousand years of history. The 
apostles Paul, Peter, and John read Hosea's symbol as stretching beyond the repentance 
and restoration of the Jews as an ethnic people to include the gathering of the church as 
the new Israel by Jesus as the Jewish Messiah, that is, a gathering of persons from all 
nations of the earth to Israel's God in repentance and faith. Paul's argument in the ninth 
chapter of Romans is that God's promises of mercy in the Old Testament are not only for 
the "children of the flesh," that is, the Jewish people, but also for the "children of the 
promise," who, in Paul's first century terminology, are the Gentiles. To support his argu-
ment, Paul refers to the prophetic symbol in Hosea: 
As indeed he [God] says in Hosea, 'Those who were not my people I will call "my 
people," and her who was not beloved I will call "beloved.'" And in the very place 
where it was said to them, "You are not my people," there they shall be called chil-
dren of the living God.'" (Rom 9:25-26) 
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In his first epistle, Peter addresses all of God's New Testament people who comprise the 
church-Jews and Gentiles alike-as Cod's "chosen race," his "royal priesthood," his "holy 
nation." This nation to whom Peter is writing are they which once "were not a people, 
but are now the people of Cod: which had not received mercy, but now have received 
mercy (J Pet 2 :9-10). Peter's allusion to Hosea in this passage makes possible an enlarged 
understanding of a symbol that escapes the boundaries of an Old Testament book to 
reverberate throughout the biblical canon. 
Finally, John offers, in the twenty-first chapter of the Revelation a similar expansion of 
Hosea's visionary language. The people of the new Jerusalem that John sees "coming 
down out of heaven from God" -a population described in chapter seven of the 
Revelation as "a great multitude that no one could count, from every nation, from all 
tribes and peoples, and languages" (v. 9)- are those described by Hosea's mark of identifi-
cation: " mhey will be his peoples, and God himself will be with them" (Rev 21 :2-3). 
Here the prophetic symbol exhibits its visionary movement into cosmic and eternal 
realms, and its close connection with the Greek word mystery already referred to as 
explored by Bullinger.80 That the chosen people of Cod are from all nations has remained 
a secret to past generations, Paul says in his letter to the Ephesians. But that mystery is 
now disclosed because God has "revealed to his holy apostles" that "the Gentiles have 
become fellow heirs, members of the same body, and sharers [with Israetl in the promise 
in Christ Jesus through the gospel" (Eph 3:5-6). In its disclosure of mystery, then, Hosea's 
visionary symbol not only remains firmly rooted, as our definitions have indicated, in the 
particular history of Israel but also reaches beyond the close of history. 
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND PossmlUTlES 
What are the implications of this literary analysis of the book of Hosea? My definitions 
of the various elements (origin through figural language) derived primarily from Ryken's 
descriptions of visionary literature and fitted to Hosea as characteristics of a particular 
genre coined "visionary prophecy" work well. Furthermore, the reading of the marriage 
narrative as a symbol for God's covenantal relationship with Israel is, in Child's canonical 
reading, endemic to the text in each stage of its composition. But to designate visionary 
prophecy as a genre and to apply it to the fifteen prophetic books of the Old Testament, 
we must learn whether the patterns that work in the book of Hosea hold in the other 
books as well. Do similar descriptions of the literary elements apply equally well to other 
prophetic books? Are these other books dominated by prophetic symbols that can be 
arranged into doubles of the five-point (A, B, C, 0 , E) paradigm of God's covenant behav-
ior with Israel?S' Can the verses of another such book be contained inclusively within the 
double layers of such a paradigm? Only with answers to these questions can we move 
toward claims about a unified literary structure typical of the prophetic books as a group. 
If further studies do yield support to such claims, we witt be able to say that a literary 
approach has offered something new in Old Testament studies, a generic term that gives 
stylistic dominance to a symbolic structure-instanced here in Hosea- that appears unique-
ly and inclusively in the books of the Hebrew prophets. 
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THEISTIC BELIEF AND POSITIVE 
EPISTEMIC STATUS: A COMPARISON OF 
ALVIN PLANTINGS AND WILLIAM JAMES 
. ",. 
DAV ID BAGGETT 
Belief in God is often characterized as antiquated and thoroughly disreputable in 
the eyes of modem science and post-Enlightenment philosophy. Kai Nielsen consid-
ers rational efforts to disprove God's existence mere "mopping up operations in the 
wake of the philosophical and scientific developments since the Enlightenment." I 
Nielsen flatly states that 
There is not the slightest reason to believe that the Christian is living according 
to "the reality principle" while the non-Christian, and the secularist in particu-
lar, is deluded about man's true estate. Christianity is myth-eaten. The very 
intelligibility of the key concepts of the religion is seriously in question; there is 
no evidence whatsoever for the existence of God; and when we keep an 
anthropological perspective in mind, we will come to recognize that the reve-
lation and authority of Christianity are but one revelation and one authority 
among thousands of conflicting revelations and authorities. Given this state of 
affairs, it is the epitome of self-delusion to believe that Jesus reveals what the 
true structure of reality is.z 
In no uncertain terms Nielsen denies the facticity of religious truth claims, most 
fundamentally the existence of God. It is of course understandable why the atheolo-
gian has focused so much effort at attacking belief in God, for such belief is the 
"heart and soul of Christian belief as well of the other theistic religions. This is a sen-
sible strategy: if. .. this belief is relevantly objectionable, he won't have to deal piece-
meal with all those more specific beliefs."3 He can simply do away with them all in 
one fell swoop. Nielsen's argument that there is no evidence for God's existence, 
that religious pluralism poses an intractable difficulty for particular religious truth 
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claims, and that theism is essentially incoherent and irremediably superstitious is obviously 
designed to show that ongoing belief in such a deity is exceedingly irrational. 
The typical way for a theist to respond to such atheological accusations is to construct 
or at least rehearse arguments, both a priori and a posteriori, in favor of Cod's existence. 
Teleological, ontological, cosmological, and moral arguments, and more besides those, are 
trotted out and presented in the hopes of answering the skeptic, persuading the nearly 
convinced, or at least satisfying the believer. 
That approach will not be taken here. For one, such a huge task would simply be too 
daunting. Each of those arguments for Cod's existence, not to mention those posed 
against God's existence, represents a book in itself. Such a venture would simply take us 
too far afield. How can a response be offered to Nielsen without the task becoming 
unwieldy? What sorts of considerations can be offered to show that religious belief is not 
irrational after all? The way it will be done here is by means of an extended comparison 
between two American philosophers, one born in 1842 and now gone, the other born in 
1932 and still quite alive. One was a pragmatist and radical empiricist, the other a leading 
contemporary analytic philosopher and epistemologist. They both loved to climb moun-
tains, attended Harvard, struggled with the problem of evil, and believed in God: William 
James and Alvin Plantinga. 
A comparison of Plantinga and James is instructive on several counts. Overlaps between 
them, especially in the face of their differences of approach and conviction, can prove to 
be helpful starting points in an analysis of the epistemic merits of theism. Discussing these 
points of contact can also provide a general orientation to some of the prominent terms of 
the debate about God's existence. An examination of their views is especially effective in 
raising prior questions that often go unasked and unanswered, questions that really ought 
not to be neglected given their centrality to religious conviction. This examination will pri-
marily be a comparison, rather than a contrast, though points of difference between their 
views clearly exist and will occasionally be mentioned in the context of the comparison, 
especially when doing so offers a point of illumination. What is remarkable is the number 
of poignant commonalities in their views, the convergence of so many of their conclusions, 
often based on quite different sorts of reasons (only occasionally inconsistent ones, though). 
What follows is a list of about a dozen or so of these similarities. 
Both James and Plantinga were vitally concemed about the intellectual propriety and 
philosophical reasonableness of theistic conviction. James counted himself among the 
"crass" supematuralists, and he took seriously the charge by such eminent agnostics of his 
day like Clifford and Huxley that theism and religious belief were irresponsible or even 
immoral, a flouting of our epistemic duties. Louis Menand writes, "It's not exactly empha-
sized any longer, but one of James's original purposes in promoting pragmatism was not 
to get rid of empirically unverifiable beliefs, but to make room, in a scientific world view, 
for faith and Cod . .. . This was explicitly the context for the 1898 lecture."4 The 1898 lec-
ture to which Menand refers, of course, is 'The Will to Believe," which has been 
described by Richard Taylor as perhaps the most widely read defense of the rationality of 
religious faith in the English language. In James's The Varieties of Religious Experience, his 
concern to uphold the importance of religious belief and practice is patently obvious even 
to the most casual reader. 
Plantinga, similarly, has taken for one of his career goals the deployment of his work in 
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defense of theism. His work on modality in the Nature of Necessity culminated in his 
defense of a modal version of the ontological argument and a dismantling of the deduc-
tive version of the problem of evil; his God and Other Minds canvassed the traditional argu-
ments for God's existence and ended with an analogical argument for theism; his Does 
God Have a Nature? discussed the connections between God and various necessary truths; 
and his trilogy on epistemology had for its goal all along Warranted Christian Beliel the 
final installment of the series and a brilliant defense of both theism generally and robust 
historical, orthodox Christianity particularly. 
Both philosophers can thus be rightly characterized as concemed with religious episte-
mology, in two senses: epistemology as it is brought to bear on religious hypotheses both 
broad and narrow. Secondly, they are also concemed with epistemology as it is shaped by 
a perspective unwilling to stack the deck against theism from the outset, unwilling to pre-
sume the falsehood of theism.s Plantinga and James were theists, and thus they stand 
among a crowd of prominent religious believers in the history of westem philosophy, 
including Kant, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Descartes, Hobbes, Augustine, Aquinas, and 
Ockham, to whom the religious hypothesis has seemed to be true, and perhaps even, in 
Plantinga's words, "the maximally important truth."6 
Concemed with the epistemic status of religious belief, both James and Plantinga exam-
ined the evidence for its truth and rationality; and when they did so they both concluded 
that the decision to accept or reject theism was not a question that could be defmitively 
settled on evidential grounds. As a radical empiricist, James insisted on looking at the evi-
dence available both for and against the religious hypothesis- and unlike Hume he didn't 
confine such experiential evidence to the bare deliverances of the physical senses. Neither 
theism nor atheism was presumed to have the upper hand. What James encountered from 
the perspective of the "purely logical perspective" was that there was not decisive evidence 
for theism. Evidence and arguments could be cited and adduced for theism, but so could 
evidence and arguments on the other side. A deductive version of the problem of evil, for 
instance, was mistakenly believed by James to pose intractable problems for an AnseImian 
conception of God. But his mistake is reflective of the fact that James refused to ignore the 
counterevidence for any proposition. When he considered the arguments both for and 
against theism, he concluded that this is not a question that can be definitively settled on 
evidential grounds. Important to note is that James was as skeptical of the arguments favor-
ing atheism or agnosticism as he was skeptical of those favoring theism. 
Plantinga, likewise, assessing the traditional theistic arguments early in his career, con-
cluded that none of them is successful from a strict evidential perspective. Years later he 
wrote about his earlier work: 
I employed a traditional. .. standard: I took it that these arguments are successful 
only if they start from propositions that compel assent from every honest and intelli-
gent person and proceed majestically to their conclusion by way of forms of argu-
ment that can be rejected only on pain of insincerity or irrationality. Naturally 
enough, I joined the contemporary chorus in holding that none of the traditional 
arguments [for theism] was successfuF 
Also paralleling James, Plantinga similarly found the arguments against theism equally 
154 Baggett 
unimpressive. Plantinga's powerful refutation of the deductive version of the problem of 
evil has now pretty much shifted that entire discussion to probabilistic versions of the 
challenge. From the perspective of the early Plantinga's internalism and classical founda-
tionalism and of what james called the purely logical intellect, evidentialism fails to pro-
vide a decisive case for either theism or its rejection. Both philosophers would thus agree 
that strict evidentialism is likely of only limited efficacy in resolving this issue. 
The question of what to do in the face of indecisive evidence with respect to theism 
constitutes one of the great divides among philosophers. Plantinga and james represent 
one side of that divide. Confronted with Clifford's dictum that indecisive evidence for 
theism means one should suspend judgment and affirm agnosticism, and to do otherwise 
involves a violation of one's epistemic duties, james remained unconvinced. His famous 
"will to believe" doctrine was his elaborate way to argue to the contrary: that a religious 
believer is well within his rights to retain his convictions. In his lucid and tightly crafted 
book on james, Hunter Brown battles fideistic and subjectivist interpretations of james by 
cogently arguing that james's robust empiricism's careful attention to all features of experi-
ence imposed a number of constraints on belief formation, constraints metaphysical, noet-
ic, evidential, factual, discursive, and theological. Brown persuasively argues that the issue 
that concerned james, particularly in his will to believe doctrine, is what would constitute 
intellectually responsible behavior towards certain existing beliefs, including religious ones 
that, while not entirely conclusive evidentially, are nonetheless generally congruent with 
those constraints. Although Brown notes that james never developed his views on classi-
cal foundational ism so technically as Plantinga, james's rejection of Clifford's dictum cer-
tainly moves in the direction of rejecting the classical picture so prominent after Descartes 
and Locke. Plantinga, even more so than james, insists that theistic believers can be deon-
tologically justified in their convictions and thus flouting no epistemic duties in the exer-
cise of their faith. In point of fact, Plantinga thinks that this question of justification is so 
easy to answer that the real essence of any theory of knowledge certainly must not rest 
content with an answer to it. Likewise with questions of internal and external rationality. 
This is of course part and parcel of his wholesale rejection of justification with its deonto-
logical connotatations, and rationality too, as the basis of warrant, that quality or quantity 
enough of which, when conjoined with true belief, constitutes knowledge. Not only is 
such justification rejected as inadequate for warrant, Plantinga argues persuasively against 
the whole traditional package involving classical foundational ism, evidentialism, and inter-
nalism, opting instead for a conception of warrant involving proper function of our cogni-
tive faculties operating in a congenial environment with its relevant parts aimed at truth. 
Clifford's dictum that "it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything 
upon insufficient evidence" is taken by Plantinga to be a stellar example of the classical 
package. Plantinga says, "Here we have the combination of deontologism and evidential-
ism. This passage doesn't display classical foundationalism as well (it doesn't say what the 
evidence must consist in), but no doubt Clifford was a classical foundationalist; at least he 
thought that belief in God requires evidence."8 
Plantinga notes the way james's "The Will to Believe" is almost a companion piece to 
Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief," noting that a better title for james's piece would have 
been "The Right to Believe." In this suggestion Plantinga may well be correct, since the 
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right to believe (more specifically, the right to retain an already existing belief) seemed to 
be James's main concern. In a book review in 1875 of P.c. Tait's The Unseen Universe, 
James spoke of a "duty" to believe, holding that belief in a transcendent realm was some-
thing one may be duty-bound to hold if it would, for the believer, be a source of com-
mendable action or peace of mind. It has been suggested that such duty terminology had 
its origins in James's contact with the work of Charles Renouvier, to whom james 
announced his indebtedness at the outset of The Will to Believe. The influence of friend 
and Cambridge philosopher Chauncey Wright seems to have changed james's mind 
about the propriety of duty terminology.9 After 1875, james no longer used such lan-
guage: entitling the essay 'The Will to Believe" and writing in 1904 to L.T. Hobhouse that 
his essay should instead have been called 'The Right to Believe" (emphasis added) . 
The basic idea of the will to believe doctrine is that under certain conditions it is not 
contrary to duty to retain belief in a proposition that is not certain. The requisite condi-
tions are the proposition's being forced, live, and momentous for the believer. Plantinga 
characterizes James as endorsing belief in a proposition for which one has no evidence for 
it, and suggests that in this way james tried to "make room for belief in God (even if not 
full Christian belief) by inserting it in the gaps of the evidence. The evidential ism and 
deontologism, again, are evident."lo Although james had made some movement away 
from the classical picture, he was still implicitly beholden to it, Plantinga notes. This seems 
right. I am less confident in Plantinga's claim, though, that james thought no evidence was 
required for the proposition in question. As will be made clearer, james- perhaps exactly 
because of vestiges of allegiance to the classical picture-insisted on continuing to speak in 
the evidentialist terms of his day and certainly believed that a proposition was not a living 
hypothesis unless it carried a great deal of evidential support. 
Plantinga notes that earlier in his own career he was somehow both accepting and 
questioning what was then axiomatic: that belief in God, if it is to be rationally acceptable, 
must be such that there is good evidence for it. This evidence, he notes, would be proposi-
tional evidence: evidence from other propositions you believe, and it would have to come 
in the form of arguments. This claim was not itself argued for, he notes. It was just assumed 
as self-evident and utterly obvious. This view is what has come to be known as evidential-
ism (with respect to belief in God). Plantinga further notes that he failed to ask why justifi-
cation is important. Further, why would rational justification require evidence? What is the 
connection between these? And if evidence is required, why would that evidence have to 
take the form of arguments? "I didn't raise these questions," he says. He continues: 
It wasn't, however, because their answers were well known, so that further inquiry 
would be carrying coals to Newcastle. On the contrary: no one else asked or 
answered these questions either; instead, people tumed directly to the arguments 
for and against theistic belief, taking it utterly for granted that this was the way to 
investigate its rational justification. 
But then Plantinga points out the one exception, the one philosopher who refused the 
fashionable answer to the 'meta-question': 
The exception was William james, whose The Will to Believe' ... was widely anthol-
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ogized and took the radical line (as it was then perceived) that if religious belief is a 
live option for you, and a forced option, then believing even without evidence is 
excusable." II 
Recall that James thought that evidential considerations for and against theism were 
not decisive from the perspective of the purely logical intellect. This is instructive, because 
it suggests that the perspective of the purely logical intellect is potentially truncated and 
incomplete, only a partial means of recognizing life's realities. If so, then James's admission 
that there is not decisive evidential support for theism from one angle may be consistent 
with his also thinking that there remain other kinds of evidence for theism that can dis-
tinctly tip the scales in its favor, even if not to the degree satisfactory to the classical foun-
dationalist. That theism is not conclusively demonstrated to be the sober truth by the evi-
dence does not, in other words, remotely suggest that James considered theism and its 
alternatives to be on an epistemic par. In fact, James did not think they were commensu-
rate in evidential support in the least (nor does Plantinga), and this is part of the signifi-
cance of what he was getting at in discussing the liveness of the theistic hypothesis. 
Hunter Brown has done the philosophical community a service by highlighting some 
of the heretofore neglected aspects of Jamesean liveness, not the least of which is a 
strongly noetic element in the believer. A proposition, to be living, must possess for the 
believer a great deal of persuasive power and intellectual plausibility. Liveness involves a 
strong inclination to believe a proposition. That this inclination is threatened for lack of 
conclusive evidential support has usually been interpreted to mean that alternative beliefs 
make comparable claims on the subject. But for James, there is distinct imbalance 
between religious options and altematives, and it is only rationality construed narrowly 
and evidential considerations construed strictly that make it appear otherwise. Unlike its 
alternative, live theism involves a tenacious passional need, engages one's sympathetic 
nature in ways not to be found in a purely abstract analysis of theism, and generates an 
invigorating disposition, intellectual openness, and what James calls the 'strenuous 
mood'.12 Depending on the expansiveness of one's conception of evidence, such considera-
tions by James mayor may not be construed as evidentialist. If all evidence, for instance, 
needs to be propositional, then some of these Jamesean considerations would fall outside 
the purview of evidence. But if all evidence need not be propositional in nature, and can 
be essentially unanalyzable, something more immediately felt and intuitively grasped, then 
such Jamesean considerations can be incorporated into an evidentialist framework more 
expansive than Clifford's classical and strict evidentialism. Such expansive evidential ism 
seems to accord with Pascal's notion of the heart having reasons the mind knows not of, 
Emersonianism's inner light, and the biblical conception of faith as being the "substance of 
things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen." Live belief, as Brown has demon-
strated, arises from a complex interdependence of many influences, the neglect of which 
in the development of norms for responsible intellectual conduct risks creating only a 
facade of doxastic responsibility behind which subjectivity may continue to exercise a 
powerful and unregulated influence. Among what is constitutive of the delicate idiosyn-
crasy and labyrinthine character of the intellectual life include an incalculable number of 
intertwining historical, cultural, linguistic, temperamental, neurological, and volitional influ-
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ences, rendering irredeemably simplistic those appeals to evidence per se or the deliver-
ances of a dispassionately judicial intellect. 
One of James's favored descriptions of moral knowledge was a kind of discemment or 
divining power, a bringing to bear of all the resources at our disposal to catch a vision of 
reality and truth. James's expansive evidential ism is undoubtedly pushing in the direction 
of nondiscursive, immediately experienced, intuitively grasped insight, which will no 
doubt remind readers of Plantinga's Reformed epistemology. According to Plantinga, the 
reason why theistic belief, to be rational, justified, and warranted, need not be evidentially 
supported by other propositions is because of the possibility that it is basic, and properly 
so. Basic beliefs, on a foundationalist picture, are those starting-point beliefs on the basis of 
which other propositions are derived and inferred deductively, inductively, or abductively. 
They are not believed on the evidential basis of other propositions; one simply sees that 
they are true and accepts them. In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga demonstrates the 
way testimony, memory, induction, and a range of other parts of our cognitive systems 
function to provide us with basic beliefs. Plantinga's (and Wolterstorffs, etc.) huge contri-
bution, of course, is the suggestion that theistic belief itself might be a properly basic belief. 
If so, then to be justified it need not be grounded in evidential considerations at all, at 
least classically construed. It can be justified, rational, and warranted if it is properly basic. 
Plantinga's story of how theism can be properly basic hearkens back to Aquinas and 
Calvin's notion that God has implanted within the human heart a capacity to know his 
reality. If this faculty- the sensus divinitatus- is functioning properly, in accord with 
Plantinga's theory of warrant and proper function, then someone can come to believe 
(and, if God really does exist, know) that God exists, and can do so nondiscursively, 
nonevidentially, and basically. 
Plantinga's account of the basicality of religious belief is quite different from James's 
account of the intuitive, nondiscursive belief in God's existence. However, to grasp some 
of the similarities here, recall that James presupposed that to be a living proposition a 
belief has to be plausible and compelling for someone. There has to be a strong inclina-
tion to believe it, even after all the evidence both for and against it has been considered; a 
"pre-existing tendency to believe," as James put it. What he defended was the intellectual 
right of those already with such pre-existing tendencies to believe a proposition to retain 
such a belief, so long as there are no compelling arguments against it. Induction, the deliv-
erances of memory, testimony, etc. are all such that none of them can be noncircularly 
established as reliable. Yet they are all also such that we possess a strong tendency to 
believe them. This would seem to make the deliverances of such cognitive faculties con-
form to Jamesean liveness in this regard. Those examples are strategically selected: 
Properly basic beliefs bear a striking resemblance to those propositions that conform to 
Jamesean liveness. If a foundationalist theory of knowledge like Plantinga's is found com-
pelling that avoids the circularity involved in trying to evidentially support the deliverances 
of induction, testimony, etc. by emphasizing proper function, then just such a theory, 
when conjoined with the sensus divinitatus, can make belief in God stand among our prop-
erly basic beliefs. That is, an epistemic account has been provided and story told that 
could make belief in God rational, justified, and warranted. 
James's conviction that theism bears the nondiscursive mark of rationality locates him 
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in the company of contemporary epistemologists such as Plantinga, Brown insists: 
James bears a closer family resemblance to a number of contemporary non-fideistic 
philosophers of religion than to the prudential fideists with whom he is more often 
associated. There is a significant resemblance, for example, between James's position 
and the positions held by some contemporary philosophers regarding epistemically 
'basic' beliefs. Discussion of what constitutes a properly basic belief is extensive. 
One common theme, however, as Nicholas Wolterstorff has put it, is that 'the prop-
er way to arrive at. .. a criterion [of basicalityl is, broadly speaking, inductive'. This 
way requires looking to certain existing beliefs in the process of producing a criteri-
on of proper basicality, rather than beginning with the criteria of classical founda-
tionalism, for example, which Plantinga, Sosa and others have shown to have seri-
ous shortcomings. Norms of basicality should be developed from 'below', as it were, 
avoiding what William Alston has deplored as the 'epistemic imperialism' involved 
in the indiscriminate application of certain abstract standards of basicality. Such stan-
dards, he and many others argue, prematurely exclude claims to the reasonableness 
of certain widely existing beliefs, including theism, and dismiss prematurely the pos-
sibility of the proper basicality of such beliefs.'] 
It might be suggested that theistic belief thus construed does not involve basicality at all, 
but just quick inferences based on the evidence. The suggestion goes like this : Rather than 
nondiscursively, knee-jerkedly coming to believe in Cod's existence when appeared to in 
certain ways, one is actually making an inference-an inference from, say, the profound 
sense of the deeply rooted moral nature of the universe to the conclusion of an omni-
benevolent Creator as, say, the most plausible account of such moral phenomenology. 
However, both James and Plantinga wished to emphasize that the degree of assurance and 
conviction that this world is theistic far surpasses the level of belief characterizing the deliv-
erances of natural theology. Bringing the notion of insight to the fore, James wrote about 
the distinctly noetic characteristics of religious experience in Varieties. Many putative reli-
gious experiences reported there are "as convincing to those who have them as any direct 
sensible experience can be," and such experiences are reported in terms not just of person-
al edification or subjective feelings but of "genuine perceptions of truth." A widespread 
claim among such reports is that the noetic element involved in such instances more close-
ly resembles an increased breadth and depth of insight than forms of comprehension gar-
nered through scientific inquiry, and that belief in the factuality of theism is related closely 
to these "states of religious insight into depth of truth unplumbed by the discursive intel-
lect." As an empiricist, James considered it his bounden duty not to neglect reports of such 
accounts in any thoroughly empirical study of the phenomenon of religious experience. 
Plantinga, similarly, contrasts the confidence and sense of certitude characteristic of reli-
gious phenomenology with the tentative, probabilistic inferences of arguments for reli-
gious truth. Plantinga has dubbed the sense of congruity or certainty, of rightness and 
truth, that accompanies religious phenomenology (as well as other basic-belief providers 
like memory), 'doxastic evidence' or 'impulsional evidence', showing his openness to a 
more expansive evidentialism potentially in line with that of James's. Such evidence carries 
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with it an assurance of conviction that exceeds what propositional evidence can provide. 
Even supposing that a case can made for, say, the historicity of Christ's resurrection that 
renders such a contingency more likely than not to have occurred (a case that I believe 
can be made), that is not necessarily enough to generate belief (even in one who finds the 
argument convincing!), and certainly not belief of sufficient strength to satisfy the require-
ments of knowledge. Suppose that from a tub of 1,000 balls, of which 499 are white and 
50 I are black, I reach in and randomly select a ball. It is more likely, of course, that I 
grabbed a black one, but that is hardly any basis for a belief to that effect of any significant 
strength. Or put it this way: If the Bayesians are right that degree of belief can be mea-
sured by a willingness to bet, it would not be very rational of me to wager very much on 
that ball being black. Though the proposition in question ("A black ball was selected") is 
more likely than not to be true, my conviction that it is true is nowhere near the convic-
tion characteristic of religious phenomenology: a depth of truth unplumbed by the discur-
sive intellect. Besides, it makes perfect sense that God, if he exists, would not structure our 
cognitive systems in such a way that only the most tutored evidentialists and skilled rea-
soners would believe in his existence on the basis of often complex philosophical argu-
mentation. A sense of God's reality universally implanted within the human heart, making 
knowledge of God available to king and peasant, educated and uneducated alike, certain-
ly resonates more deeply with the message of God's universal love as revealed in the 
Christian gospel. This account also, incidentally, makes considerable sense of the wide-
spread belief in God's existence throughout the world and human history.'4 
A few additional points of similarity between James and Plantinga deserve emphasis. 
The epistemic theory being sketched here, with points of commonality between James 
and Plantinga, can be characterized as a version of naturalistic epistemology. [n Warrant 
and Proper Function, Plantinga talks about three senses of such epistemology, the most 
stringent of which involves Quine's "transmogrification of epistemology into descriptive 
psychology." Whenever epistemology accords great weight in determining normative con-
straints on intellectual behavior on the basis of widespread psychological phenomena, the 
reminder invariably manifests: 'We're supposed to be doing epistemology, not psycholo-
gy!" James was one of the first leading psychologists of course and the author of the mag-
num opus Principles of Psychology. He only naturally allowed his psychological interests, it 
can be argued, to dictate the form of his epistemological musings. The bulk of 'The Will 
to Believe" can be thought of as an elaborate parenthetical exploration of the actual psy-
chology of human opinion and an exploration of the relations among the many influ-
ences that really do produce our creeds. The picture that emerges is one of considerable 
complexity. But epistemology, contra Wittgenstein, is not the science of psychology. 
Fortunately, there are weaker versions of naturalistic epistemology that do not commit 
one to equating or reducing epistemology to descriptive psychology. 
Both James and Plantinga expressed strong reservations about treating the religious 
hypothesis like a scientific postulate. [n James this took the form of his denying that the 
function or purpose of religion is to solve our intellectual problems. James did not think 
the purpose of religion was to close questions, but to fire our imaginations and sustain 
philosophical questions. He was opposed to all forms of clean-shaven theories that treated 
questions as definitively closed. He did not consider scientific reasoning to be the most 
160 Baggett 
pristine form of reasoning to which all other forms should aspire; to the contrary, he 
thought scientific reasoning was one kind among many others, and that the considerably 
more fundamental method of rationality than scientific reasoning was the creative imposi-
tion of form that was as much within the artist's purview than the scientist's. James was 
not a divine command theorist, for instance; most of James's moral concerns were bot-
tom-up, less interested in moral metaphysics than moral epistemology. An ineliminable 
aspect of his moral epistemology, consistent with his radical empiricism, were the actual 
concrete historical processes by which we hopefully come ever closer to that maximally 
inclusive moral order in which James believed. He had little patience for any top-down, 
single-principled moral theory of any kind, theistic or otherwise, especially one that 
claimed to give the definitive explanation of something so rich as morality. He thought 
that the moral life necessarily requires not just theory but a dialectic between thought and 
history, the theoretical and concrete. In speaking of a transcendent moral order, and heav-
en as symbolic of our deepest moral ideals, he occasionally sounded a bit like a divine 
command theorist, but he was not. A large reason for this was his aversion to treating reli-
gion as a hypothetical postulate rather than a living experiential reality. 
In Plantinga the analogous aversion takes the form of rejecting the practice of making 
theism's epistemic status dependent on how well it functions as the best explanation of vari-
ous phenomena, that is, treating the religious hypothesis as a mere scientific-like postulate. 
He thinks that theism may well be a good or even the best explanation of various phenom-
ena, morality included, but that even if it were explanatorily idle it would be no less warrant-
ed in the contingency that God exists. For again, religious belief for Plantinga is not warrant-
ed on the basis of abductive inferences. ls Such a foundation is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for the degree of belief religious knowledge requires. Robert Adams, too, in his latest 
book on theistic ethics, also echoes scepticism conceming science-inspired epistemologies as 
applied to either religion or ethics, epistemologies that outside the realm of an empirical 
analysis of the physical world have not yielded nearly so much fruit as science herself.16 
In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga distinguishes the question of the truth of the the-
istic hypothesis from the rationality or epistemic status of theistic belief. He calls the for-
mer the de facto question, and the latter the de jure question. One of his recurring theses is 
that answering the de jure question in the negative is difficult to do without presupposing 
a negative answer to the de facto question. Without assuming the falsehood of theism one 
is hard-pressed to argue for the irrationality, unjustifiability, or unwarranted nature of reli-
gious belief. In contrast to his former classical foundationalist self, he has now rejected 
internalism, taking the salient lesson from Gettier problems to be the inadequacy of an 
internalist model of justification as constitutive of warrant (even with the benefit of vari-
ous contenders for fourth conditions). His theory of knowledge is now distinctly extemal-
ist, recognizing the connections between ontological assumptions about the way the 
world is and what strikes one as rational. If God does not exist, Plantinga admits that war-
rant is probably not enjoyed by religious believers, as there would be no sensus divinitatus 
by which theistic conviction would enjoy the status of proper basicality, no functioning 
internal instigation of the Holy Spirit to seal knowledge of the distinctively Christian God 
on our hearts. Plantinga also admits, in consonance with his rejection of classical founda-
tionalism, that a story like his about justified, rational, and warranted de jure belief in God's 
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existence will by no means prove universally compelling to all rational persons. There is 
thus no logical guarantee to which we can be privy given our epistemological limitations 
that there is the requisite commensurateness between our de jure and de faao beliefs, 
between persons and world. It is just such absence of a guarantee of commensurateness 
that impels a classical evidentialist like Clifford to insist that the possibility of being wrong 
- even in the face of the most personally compelling phenomenological features of reli-
gious conviction- makes agnosticism the proper course. Better lose truth than risk error. 
Of course James wished to ask why this Cliffordian passional decision under the guise of 
a purely judicial intellect is any less a risk of error. In fact, James insisted that, if it should 
tum out to be the case that it is only by an experience of the world that accords episte-
mological significance to distinctive experiential states that a particular commensurateness 
between persons and world can be discovered, then the a priori discounting of those 
states would permanently preclude its discovery. As Brown makes clear, James found 
entirely dubious the propensity to beg such questions by automatically privileging conven-
tional canons of evidentially responsible behavior without due regard for the challenge 
posed to those very canons by such a recalcitrant phenomenon as live theism. For James, 
whether religious phenomenology functions as evidence depends on whether there is this 
commensurateness between person and world. However, the potential evidence, to be 
evidence, does not require our knowing in advance that it is. To require that it did would 
be to say that knowledge requires knowledge that we have knowledge, and James explic-
itly rejected such a formula as reflective of the sort of rationalism and absolutism against 
which he valiantly labored. So for both Plantinga and James, if the world turns out to be a 
certain way, something like religious phenomenology can function evidentially for us, in a 
broad sense. This would raise the possibility that we can have a firm knowledge of aspects 
of divine reality without our knowing that we possess such knowledge. 
Supposing that one is wrong about what he thinks to be divine reality, though, is it the 
case that there is nothing that could possibly undermine his conviction here and now? 
This question has been posed to both James and Plantinga in different ways. Cannot 
James's will to believe doctrine be used for all sorts of beliefs, without anything holding 
such liberal applications of his method in check? Similarly with Plantinga; does not his 
view entail that all sorts of eccentric views can be held to be properly basic? Are there no 
constraints in place to preclude such wishful thinking? Here James and Plantinga each has 
an effective answer, it seems to me, though their answers somewhat diverge, owing to dif-
ferences in their conception of God and, to some degree, differences in what it is they are 
trying to defend. But each answer is worth mentioning. First, what was James's response 
to such accusations of his view lending itself to unchecked willful wishful thinking? In 
James's account subjective influences do not enjoy the degree of autonomy imputed to 
them by critics who saddle him with the charge of wishful thinking. James depicted sub-
jective states as framed and limited in their influence by their interrelations within the 
unity of the many elements that together constitute immediate experience, and also by 
their interrelations with the many different kinds of consequences which flow from partic-
ular beliefs. Brown attacks the long-standing propensity among commentators to ignore 
this complex unity of immediate experience, and neglect therefore the degree to which, 
within such a position, subjective influences are integrally involved in an immediate, multi-
162 Baggett 
dimensional concrete relationship with the world which issues in results and conse-
quences that cannot be responsibly ignored. The related prudential complaint that James 
gave primacy to personally desirable consequences in defending theistic belief fails to 
grapple with what consequences were in fact held by James to flow from live theism. The 
major consequence of theistic belief as James construed it is the strenuous mood, which 
suffuses the moral life with the note of infinitude and mystery. Living in the strenuous 
mood is to reject self-interest, identify with the disenfranchised, elevate the fervor with 
which the pursuit of moral discemment is undertaken, and heighten participation in the 
historical dialectic of theory and demand. The often trying, counter-cultural, and costly 
features of the strenuous mood bear little resemblance to easy conformism, personal 
advantage, or wishful thinking. 
Plantinga in the past has had to contend with the "Creat Pumpkin Objection": If belief 
in Cod can be properly basic, then so can any other belief, no matter how bizarre, includ-
ing belief in the Creat Pumpkin. To which Plantinga's answer is simply that just by recog-
nizing that some kinds of beliefs are basic does not for a moment commit one to saying 
that all other kinds of belief are. Michael Martin recognizes that that objection is a non-
starter, but still thinks that Plantinga's view is radically relativistic. Plantinga dubs Martin's 
criticism "Son of Creat Pumpkin" : Take any possible community and any beliefs accepted 
as basic in that community. The epistemologists of that community could legitimately 
claim that these beliefs are rationally accepted in the basic way, on Plantinga's view, 
according to Martin. But Plantinga replies by showing that the only respectable objection 
requires taking both "rationally" and "legitimately" as "warrantedly." Now, does it follow 
that for any proposition p, if there were a community who endorsed p, these people 
would be warranted in believing that p is properly basic with respect to warrant for those 
in that community? No, for suppose that Plantinga's model is true and the central claims 
of Christianity are true, there really is the sensus divinitatus, and the deliverance of such a 
process meets the conditions for warrant. It by no means follows that, say, the voodoo 
epistemologist is also warranted in claiming that voodoo belief is properly basic with 
respect to warrant. For such belief could be false or the product of all kinds of cognitive 
malfunction or could lack warrant for yet some other reason. Martin's argument fails. 
Plantinga applies the notion of defeaters to warrant, though, in raising a way in which a 
properly basic belief can be called into question. Suppose the following scenario: I see a 
person from a distance at a party whom I think is Brian, but later discover from a totally 
reliable source that he was elsewhere at the time. The belief I had earlier that Brian was at 
the party was a basic one, based in immediate sense perception. I did not infer that Brian 
was there on the basis of having seen someone whom I thought was him. Seeing that 
person was just the occasion in which I automatically formed the properly basic belief 
that Brian was there. The additional information I discover later serves as a defeater for 
my warranted belief that Brian was at the party. A defeater makes it the case that the 
belief that until then may well be warranted can no longer be believed rationally. 
Plantinga admits that theistic belief in theory might confront such a defeater, just as James 
believed that the theistic hypothesis could in principle confront some intractable experien-
tial or consequential difficulty. Plantinga examines four possibilities: projective theories of 
religion, contemporary biblical criticism, pluralism and postmodemism, and the facts of 
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evil. He concludes that none of these defeaters works and, as the contemporary episte-
mological scene stands, he agrees with Chesterton that 'The philosophical case against 
theism is rather easily dealt with. There is no philosophical case against theism."I? 
Before applying this set of epistemic insights and perspectives to Nielsen's challenge to 
theistic belief, a brief summary is in order. Classical foundationalism, C1iffordian evidential-
ism, and the notion of deontological justification pose no difficulties for theistic faith: 
Classical foundational ism is self-referentially refuting; C1iffordian evidentialism is as motivat-
ed by its own passional subjective commitments that involve no less a risk of error as do 
Jamesean rights to believe; and countless religious believers, having weighed the evidence 
both for and against he religious hypothesis, have persisted in their intuitive sense that the-
ism is the sober truth of the matter. As Plantinga has argued, they are thus subjectively jus-
tified, and if there is some objective duty that such believers are flouting, it remains unclear 
what it is. The question of rationality really comes down to the question of warrant, and 
something like Plantinga's account of warrant and proper function may well constitute at 
least the approximately right view of the matter. Such a theory of knowledge, on the 
assumption that Cod is real and has given us a faculty to recognize that, not only makes 
religious belief possible and permissible, but knowledge of Cod intended and normative. 
On such a picture, belief in Cod is properly basic, and this can be construed as consonant 
with evidential ism broadly construed, where religious phenomenology can be taken to be 
a kind of non propositional evidence. Such evidence is not assumed to be able to meet the 
standards imposed by classical foundational ism, however. But for those for whom the reli-
gious hypothesis seems to be true, even after all the evidence against it has been carefully 
weighed, such ongoing religious belief retains positive epistemic status. In fact, belief pro-
duced according at least roughly to Plantinga's story would be considerably stronger than 
belief produced by the deliverances of the discursive intellect applied to natural theology. 
The broadly empirical theory of knowledge adhered to here can be described as markedly 
extemalist, which has for one of its entailments that if Cod does not exist, the religious 
believer is radically wrong. But if Cod does exist, then the religious believers who allow 
such belief to shape their view of rationality and the nature of the world- including morali-
ty- are likely radically right. Theism is not, however, to be treated by believers as a tenta-
tive scientific hypothesis that commands only as much conviction in its adherents as what 
can be generated by abductive inferences to the effect that theism best explains various 
phenomena. The account can also be seen as a mild species of naturalistic epistemology, 
but one that avoids the reductionism of stronger versions of it, and one that by according 
such weight to insight and the nondiscursive intellect carves out as much epistemic space 
for intuitions to satisfy practically the most ardent intuitionist. Although by this account the 
religious believer can be said to have knowledge that Cod exists if Cod exists, it remains 
the duty of at least a critical mass within such communities, given our current epistemic 
limitations (such as our inability to know that we know Cod exists), to critically examine 
potential defeaters to religious belief, and for all religious believers to examine carefully and 
honestly the consequences produced by their conviction. 
As to Nielsen's claim, recall his bold assertion that there is simply no evidence for 
Christianity in particular or theism generally.18 Most of what needs to be said has already 
been covered. For simplicity's sake, let us confine our attention to the latter claim, that 
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there is no evidence at all to suggest that God exists. Nielsen insists that this is the case, 
repeatedly in fact. But it should be obvious by now that the mere assertion of such a bold 
claim does nothing to make it true, and next to nothing by way of dissuading thoughtful, 
committed theists from retaining their faith . What does Nielsen mean by evidence? Does 
he automatically preclude the potential non propositional evidence provided by 
Plantinga's impulsional beliefs or James's nondiscursive deliverances? If so, why? More 
specifically, why should a committed theist concur? Nielsen reminds me of those who 
claim that no right-thinking persons can possibly believe in Cod anymore, when it certain-
ly seems like there are a great number of them! What could motivate such bold claims? 
Does Nielsen really think that every effort to show that Cod exists, every person for 
whom the existence of Cod seems as clear as anything, every piece of religious phenome-
nology, every deliverance of an expansively empirical study of religious experience, cumu-
latively add up to absolutely no evidence at all for the truth of theism? If he does, that 
strikes me as monumentally unlikely, so much so in fact that further discussion with him 
on the issue would probably prove pointless. For it would seem altogether probable that 
his atheological bias is radically skewing his capacity for fair-minded examination of the 
evidence. And if Cod does exist, and something like Plantinga's model is essentially right, 
then it is not the theist who is cognitively at fault, but rather it is one like Nielsen who is 
suffering from a sort of cognitive dysfunction. Though I point that out, it is not my goal to 
engage in a contentious epistemic tit-for-tat here. I would rather counsel that we proceed 
in the spirit of this passage from James: 
We ought. . . delicately and profoundly to respect one another's mental freedom : 
then only shall we bring about the intellectual republic; then only shall we have that 
spirit of inner tolerance without which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which 
is empiricism's glory; then only shall we live and let live in speculative as well as in 
practical things. 19 
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